Pennsylvania’s Constitutional Restriction on Legislated Limitations on Damages
The pertinent language is found in Art. III, §18 and provides as follows:
“The General Assembly may [cap damages as part of a workers compensation system]; but in no other cases shall the General Assembly limit the amount to be recovered for injuries resulting in death, or for injuries to persons or property ….”
Art. III, §18 is a formidable restriction. However, it does not preclude all legislative action related to the amount of recoverable damages in tort actions.
The courts have upheld the constitutionality of several legislative proposals that limit damages in tort actions:
- Initial Workers’ Compensation law—Under the initial Workers' Compensation law, an employee elected at the time of employment whether to retain his or her common law tort remedies or to participate in a no-fault system that capped the recoverable compensation. At the time the law was enacted, Art. III, §18 did not include the language permitting a Workers’ Compensation system.
Example: In Anderson v. Carnegie Steel Co., [1] the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected a challenge to the statutory scheme. The court reasoned that the law did not violate the constitutional prohibition on legislated caps on damages because the cap applied “only when the parties to the contract of employment so agree.”
- No-fault auto law—The Motor Vehicle No-Fault Act (since repealed) abolished tort liability in motor vehicle accident cases, except in limited circumstances, and substituted a no-fault compensation system that limited the recoverable compensation.
Example: In Singer v. Sheppard, [2] the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of that law. It distinguished between capping the recoverable damages and abolishing the cause of action entirely, holding that the later is constitutionally permissible.
- Actions against governmental parties—Chapter 85 of Title 42 (involving matters affecting government parties) caps damages in suits against a Commonwealth party at $250,000 per plaintiff and $1,000,000 in the aggregate, [3] and caps damages in suits against a political subdivision party at $500,000 in the aggregate [4].
Example: In Smith v. City of Philadelphia, [5] the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the political subdivision cap. The Court concluded that the cap was authorized by the Legislature’s authority under Art. I, §11 to regulate the manner in which suits may be brought against the Commonwealth and limited the application of the Art. III, §18 restriction on caps to suits against private parties.
- Cap on punitive damages—The 1996 medical professional liability reform package (Act 135) capped punitive damages at 200 percent of the compensatory damages [6]. This provision was left intact when the court sua sponte struck down other provisions in the 1996 law (including other provisions involving punitive damages) on separation of powers grounds. There also has been debate over whether a cap on non-economic damages only would survive a constitutional challenge—particularly if the cap was a percentage of the economic loss, rather than a fixed limit. However, to assure that a legislated cap on non-economic damages would withstand constitutional scrutiny, an amendment to the state constitution is the best protection.
Endnotes
[1] 99 A. 215 (Pa. 1916).
[2] 346 A.2d 897 (Pa. 1975).
[3] 42 Pa.C.S. §8528.
[4] 42 Pa.C.S. §§8549, 8553.
[5] 516 A.2d 306 (Pa. 1986), appeal dismissed, 479 U.S. 1074 (1987).
[6] 40 P.S. §1301.812-A(g).
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Last Updated: 8/12/2008